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1 Introduction
The first part of the article argues that the
poorest have traditionally been excluded from
conventional poverty alleviation programmes.
This, in turn, opened up a space for civil society
organisations, such as the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh,
to think creatively about how to bring the most
marginalised into the folds of their mainstream
development interventions. The positive results
from BRAC’s Targeting Ultra Poor (TUP)
experiment inspired organisations globally to try
and test the BRAC model in their contexts.
The second part of the article delves into the
process evaluation findings from one such
adaptation – Swayam Krishi Sangam (SKS)
Foundation’s Ultra Poor pilot programme (UPP)
in Andhra Pradesh, India. Specifically, it
discusses the challenges of scaling a pilot into a
nation-wide programme – can the successes be
transferred, and how important is state
engagement in reaching the masses and
sustaining these results?
1.1 Excluding the poorest
A large body of work has pointed to the fact that
conventional development interventions, namely
state-run programmes and microfinance
interventions, have traditionally bypassed or
actively excluded the most vulnerable. This
includes extremely poor and female-headed
households (although in the context of India,
these are generally one and the same).
Government programmes have faced a number of
challenges in reaching the most vulnerable. First,
they operate on such a large scale that it is
difficult to implement targeting tools that capture
the various nuances in poverty levels. Given that
extremely vulnerable households are generally
unaware of how to apply for government services
and are often unregistered, adds to their
likelihood of being bypassed. Second, state
interventions do not generally lack the ability to
tackle the complex web of deprivations that affect
extremely poor households. State programmes,
such as wage employment or the provision of
productive assets, assume that the income boost
alone will help households ‘escape’ poverty as a
one-step process. Alternatively, they provide food
rations or other forms of one-off assistance that
can only help them smooth consumption when
they face a temporary shock. Lastly, local level
bureaucracy, inefficiency and corruption that
characterise state interventions work against the
poorest. Interviews with extremely poor people in
Andhra Pradesh revealed a grave mistrust
towards government officials for the clandestine
ways they make decisions about to whom to
distribute pro-poor services.
The poorest are not the ones who get the BPL card.
Those who have autos and bikes receive our rations.
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The government officials meet at the weekly market
and they tell secrets – secrets of whom they will give
things to. We have no way of knowing.
This lack of transparency in targeting opens up
avenues for corruption and rent-seeking:
I applied 3 times and never received a BPL [Below
Poverty Line] card. I begged, did not eat, and bribed
them with 300INR. Still I have received nothing,
just empty promises.
Existing literature reinforces the above points.
Mooji (2003) states that in Andhra Pradesh, the
government intended to be more ‘simple, moral,
accountable, responsive and transparent
(SMART)’ in state-wide development initiatives.
But in reality, their Participatory Irrigation
Management scheme, which aimed to
decentralise decision-making power to local
farmers and water users, was in-fact co-opted by
wealthy landlords, upper castes, and better
educated people affiliated with a political party.
Participation of women and ‘weaker sections’ of
society in decision-making was negligible (Mooji
2003). Pellissery (2005) argues that anti-poverty
programmes in the state of Maharashtra have
deficits in their implementation. They strengthen
local elites’ capacity to wield power and support
their own private interests, as excluding the
poorest from income generating schemes enables
the local elite to ‘avail cheap and instant labour
for their private works’ (Pellissery 2005: 2).
Microfinance, another widely implemented
development intervention across South Asia, did
target women specifically – but excluded
extremely poor women, for which various
reasons have been put forth. These include
group-exclusion, where the moderate poor do not
accept the extreme poor into their lending
groups; and self-exclusion, where rigid
repayment structures and the emphasis on
borrowing discourage the extreme poor from
wanting to join microfinance programmes
(Hashemi 1997; Rahman and Razzaque 2000).
Studies also show that the poorest do not benefit
even if they do join microfinance, as they do not
enter with existing enterprises (Banerjee, Duflo,
Glennerster and Kinnan 2009). They thus earn
fewer profits, and are more likely to be inactive
members that frequently enter and exit. A
review of studies on government and non-
government credit programmes in India noted
systematic evidence of exclusion of poorer
households, lower castes, women and female-
headed households (Kabeer and Murthy 1997).
1.2 The BRAC response
In response to these gaps, which were particularly
prevalent in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC) experimented
with a development intervention that focused
upon extremely poor, female-headed households.
Extremely poor people, they realised, do not
move along a continuum and escalate out of
poverty. Rather, they oscillate into and out of
poverty, and therefore need diverse income
sources and safety nets to be able to cope with
shocks. Through their Targeting Ultra Poor
(TUP) intervention, they focused upon reversing
what Devereux refers to as the three elements of
destitution: meeting minimum subsistence needs,
accessing key productive assets, and ending their
dependence on transfers (Devereux 2003).
Upon carefully targeting the extreme poor, TUP
beneficiaries receive a small cash stipend to help
them meet their consumption needs; a productive
asset so they can begin generating their own
income; access to health services, as health
shocks are often the greatest drivers of poverty;
and complementary services such as skills and
social development training, weekly hand-holding
support by field staff, veterinary support, and
linkages with local elite who act as a vertical
social network. TUP beneficiaries receive this set
of inputs for a total of 18 months, with the end
goal of transitioning them out of extreme poverty
and into a sustainable livelihood.
Impact assessment results of BRAC’s TUP
programme have been overwhelmingly positive.
As compared to the control group, TUP
beneficiaries purchased more productive assets
(land, rickshaws, vans, and boats); enrolled their
girls in primary school; have a much higher level
of savings; and tend to use cash loans for income
generating activities rather than for crisis coping
(as the case for control group households)
(Rabbani, Prakash and Sulaiman 2006).
Given these impacts, other civil society
organisations around the world have been eager to
follow suit. Noting this interest and the potential
that such an initiative could have upon global
extreme poverty levels, CGAP and the Ford
Foundation spearheaded the ‘global graduation
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programmes’. As a part of this initiative, they
partnered with nine local organisations in seven
countries1 to adapt BRAC’s methodology to their
own contexts. The foundation of the intervention
remains the same: increased consumption,
improved health access, income generation, and
awareness creation. Each beneficiary is also
assigned a ‘field assistant’ whose role is two-fold:
to help develop their productive skills and monitor
their progress, as well as expand their time
horizons by creating milestones for the future.
The remit is to build promotional ladders by
enhancing income generation, as well as to
provide social safety nets by ensuring adequate
access to food, healthcare, and moral support.
SKS is one of the nine pilot programmes being
implemented in the Telangana region of Andhra
Pradesh, India. The programme has successfully
penetrated the microfinance market, yet through
its 12 years of operation, SKS learned that their
solidarity lending programme effectively
excluded the poorest within the communities in
which they worked.
In response, SKS initiated the Ultra Poor
Programme (UPP). The UPP is geared towards
those who do not meet the inclusion criteria for
microfinance – in essence, those whom SKS
classifies as the poorest. The package of inputs
was extended to 426 women over an 18-month
period (October 2007– June 2009).
The purpose of SKS’s Ultra Poor Programme is to
create sustainable livelihoods so that the
extremely poor can graduate into one of two paths:
z Join an existing microfinance programme in
the area (for the few that are strong enough
to integrate into mainstream microfinance)
z Continue saving in groups and use their
savings to strengthen and diversify their asset
base (a viable transition for most).
2 Process evaluation
The UPP process evaluation responded to SKS’
request for feedback in order to make
programmatic modifications prior to scale-up. It
took place at the midpoint of the pilot (July 2008
to December 2008), nine months into their 18-
month implementation. This evaluation does not
seek to explain outcomes. Rather, it aims to
provide an in-depth understanding of the processes
of implementation from the perspectives of the
UPP programme beneficiaries and SKS staff. As
Figure 1 illustrates, processes refer to the
mechanisms by which key inputs of the
programme have been operationalised, and the
means by which programmatic outcomes are
achieved. This evaluation interrogates this
pathway (Huda and Simanowitz 2009).
2.1 Targeting
Disaggregating the poor and identifying the most
vulnerable is the foundation of the CGAP/Ford
Foundation graduation programmes. A good
targeting methodology is important, not just to
ensure that the correct beneficiaries are selected,
but to demonstrate a transparent and rational
process to the community and external
stakeholders. Initially, SKS identified a list of
inclusion and exclusion criteria that beneficiaries
must fulfil in order to qualify for the programme
(Table 1). These indicators were the opposite of
those used to select SKS microfinance clients.
While microfinance clients were selected based on
creditworthiness and economic ‘activeness’ (e.g.
existing entrepreneurial abilities, a household
guarantor who could help with repayments, and the
self-confidence to take a loan), UPP members were
chosen because they lacked these characteristics.
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Figure 1 Hypothesised pathway out of poverty
Outputs:
z Ideal assets for members
z Protection for assets
z Income generation
z Financial independence
z Increase awareness of
government resources






z Individual household visits
z Health Field Assts (FAs)
and Health director
z Centre leaders










Objective criteria such as these are necessary for
standardisation and scalability. SKS required a
set of simple and easily verifiable indicators that
every branch office could use in order to keep the
selection process manageable when reaching a
large number of people in varied locations
around the country. However, poverty is
contextualised depending on area, and these
sensitivities need to be accounted for. Relying
solely on objective indicators leads to decisions
that are free of nuance, and excludes the
community from the selection process. SKS
therefore also drew upon community perceptions
of poverty through a wealth ranking exercise,
where local villagers identified those whom they
felt were the poorest in their communities. This
brought a localised understanding of extreme
poverty to the initiative, while securing
community buy-in. Staff, whose unique
perspective combines both local and
programmatic notions of poverty, made the final
decisions through home visits and communal
discussions. Taking from BRAC’s targeting
approach, SKS feels that by leveraging
indigenous and programmatic knowledge, and
triangulating between participatory and survey
tools, they are able to narrow down the poorest
more effectively (Matin and Halder 2004).
A few important lessons can be drawn from this
targeting approach. First, SKS has appropriately
implemented their targeting methodology and selected
members based on their inclusion/exclusion criteria.2
According to the baseline survey results,3 89 per
cent of members are widowed/abandoned; 86 per
cent had no livestock prior to joining the UPP
programme and 62 per cent owned no
agricultural land. Case studies and focus group
discussions (FGDs) also reconfirm this selection
profile, where every member interviewed had no
male household counterpart; had less than an
acre of cultivable land and no-one possessed any
livestock at the time of joining the programme.
Second, SKS UP staff have simple and relevant
inclusion criteria, which will facilitate their scale-up
process. Having only two products, UPP and
microfinance lending, helps programme staff
easily identify potential UPP members, as the
targeting criteria contrast with each other.
Conceptually, however, the targeting approach is
based on a static notion of poverty. Those who
are extremely poor today would be captured, but
not those who become poor tomorrow. As SKS
continues to scale to new sites and branches,
there is little scope to return to original areas
and bring the ‘new poor’ into the folds of the
programme. Similarly, those who are targeted as
extremely poor may have faced a sudden recent
decline, but if one were to target them six
months before or after, their situation would
appear very different. Targeting methodology
that captures ‘snapshots’ and does not consider
the factor of time and the dynamic nature of
poverty is not unique to SKS or the graduation
programmes. Most development interventions
that seek out beneficiaries, rather than having
individuals apply to gain access to the programme
(as with pro-poor government initiatives), rarely
revisit areas once implementation has occurred.
2.2 Design and delivery
SKS’s inputs were well conceptualised as part of
the service delivery design – these include the
assets, stipend, field assistant interface, health
assistant interface and training. Learning from
BRAC, SKS has combined both protective and
promotional elements to ensure a holistic
approach.
During any pilot programme, a number of
unexpected issues arise which call for
modification of inputs and alterations in strategy.
This is especially true for the extreme poor, who
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Table 1 Inclusion criteria
zWoman-headed household (widowed, divorced, husband unable to generate income) 
z Age below 60 years
z Ability to work
z Not a microfinance member
z If an SHG member, loan balance should not exceed 2,500 INR (but if she meets all other criteria, this can be
overlooked) 
z No livestock
zWetland of less than 0.5 acre, or dry land of less than 1.5 acres, or not getting any/very little income from land
may face unanticipated constraints. The key is to
be responsive to these constraints, but to keep
programmatic modifications to a minimum. A
programme that is highly customised and
continues to ‘add on’ inputs and respond to every
individual need drives up programme costs. For a
programme to be manageable and easily
replicated, a certain level of standardisation is
required.
SKS has maintained this balance. They have made
a few of the following modifications in response to
needs that arose during the course of the pilot:
z Due to inefficiencies in government health
services, SKS hired a Health Director to treat
beneficiaries, train field assistants and SKS
health workers. Beneficiaries complained of
government health services being far away,
thus incurring high transport costs;
government hospital staff discriminated
against their socioeconomic status; and
doctors were not available when emergencies
occurred at night. SKS felt they needed to
respond to this gap, and thus increased the
capacity of their staff to respond to illnesses
and health emergencies.
z Since the programme cannot fund major
health emergencies, they encouraged members
to set aside at least Rs10 at each meeting to
act as their own personal health fund. The
motivation was to create a buffer against
health emergencies so members would not be
compelled to sell off assets or fall into debt.
z With the increase of rice prices, members
were encouraged to begin a ‘rice saving
scheme’, which involved saving a handful of
rice in a communal pot every day. A member
can take from the community rice store when
in need and replace the amount taken.
SKS did not significantly drive up their costs with
these modifications. They stayed true to their
initial design of inputs in order to maintain cost-
effectiveness, programmatic discipline, and a
focus upon livelihoods promotion. By sticking to
core inputs, SKS has created a model that is
affordable, replicable and scalable.
2.3 Stipend design
SKS has a unique perspective on the use of
stipends. The traditional view (adopted from
BRAC’s TUP programme) is that the
procurement of assets will force members to
devote less time to daily wage labour (their
primary means of income prior to joining the
programme), and thus they need financial
support to offset this income loss. SKS
encourages members to continue their daily
wage labour, while simultaneously taking care of
their assets – this way, the assets will boost their
existing income rather than replace it.
With this conceptualisation, members do not need
a stipend to offset income losses. SKS also firmly
believes that regularly distributing money to
members creates a dependency upon this handout,
thus creating resentment once the stipend ends.
Taking what they believe to be a more
‘empowering’ approach, SKS informed members
that if they are unable to pay for animal fodder for
a particular week, SKS will assist them with the
stipend. They are strict on the stipend being used
towards the asset, and not for consumption – a
drastically different approach from BRAC and the
other graduation pilots that insist that the stipend
is essential in ensuring food security.
There was initial scepticism as to whether the
stipends were actually used towards livelihoods,
as money is fungible and can be used towards
anything. However, three months of data on
stipend use illustrated that stipends are utilised
100 per cent of the time towards assets (e.g.
animal fodder, stock for kirana shop owners,
sewing needles/thread for tailors, pesticides/
fertilisers for those in land cultivation, etc.) Case
studies reaffirmed this finding, as one member
stated:
I took Rs300 two weeks ago to buy fodder for my
buffalo. Right now it is hard to find fodder in the
fields, and it is very expensive in the markets. The
Rs300 were not enough, I still had to take out Rs500
of my savings to purchase the fodder.
When asked if she had saved part of the stipend
or used it towards anything else, she exclaimed,
How is that possible? Fodder costs more than the
stipend, so how can I save it or use it for anything
else?
Although members are not spending their
stipend on consumption, interviews illustrate
that they have increased their expenditure on
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food items, which appears to be the result of
greater household income due to their
productive assets. This is a tremendous learning
for all the pilots, and challenges the conventional
notion that members need monetary assistance
to boost their consumption levels.
The majority of members had also requested
their stipend once, and about 20 per cent of
members had never requested a stipend because
they ‘never needed one’. This differs from other
graduation pilots where members are given
weekly consumption stipends, and many
requested extensions upon the stipend period
terminating.
SKS’s system behind the stipend is
programmatically cost-effective, and does foster
independence on behalf of the members. It must
be considered, however, that this use of the
stipend is context-specific. SKS members in the
Telangana region benefited from daily wage
labour schemes through the government,
reducing their need for an alternative source of
daily income. In contexts where employment
opportunities are more scarce, the consumption
stipend is necessary to boost consumption levels.
It should also be noted that graduation pilot
beneficiaries elsewhere demonstrated a
tremendous amount of creativity when they were
given cash stipends and the freedom to use it
towards anything. Members in the Haiti pilot,
for instance, took part of their stipend and saved
it in a rotating savings group – when it was their
turn at the lump sum, they used it diversify into
small side businesses.
2.4 Livelihood choices
Building productive assets is one of the most
important aims for UPP. Assets are intended to
provide regular and reliable daily income (to
overcome the insecurity of daily living) as well as
longer-term income (for savings against the
future and security in times of hardship).
Prior to joining the programme, UPP members
had a lack of productive assets and asset savings.
The fragility of their sources of daily income
undermined their ability to accumulate assets for
the future. Lack of assets meant they were less
resilient against shocks and vulnerabilities.
SKS promoted asset development through the
following strategies:
z Allowing members to choose any viable asset
that had market potential
z Intensive training prior to receiving the asset
and refresher courses
z Constant staff support and advice.
Table 2 provides a staff analysis of the risks,
benefits and characteristics of who would benefit
from each asset choice.
Through these various experiences with the
above assets, SKS has drawn up some key lessons:
z Need for short- and long-term income: An
important learning through BRAC is the need
for both a short-term asset that can bring day-
to-day income after the stipend ends, and a
long-term asset that can act as savings against
future expenses. Most graduation pilots offer
two assets to achieve this dual purpose. SKS’
strategy has been either to provide one asset
that serves both purposes (e.g. a pregnant
buffalo, where its milk can be sold daily as a
regular source of income, while the buffalo
and its offspring act as the long-term income
source). Alternatively, members are
encouraged to continue their daily labour as a
regular source of income, and they are given
only a long-term asset (e.g. land for
cultivation, goats, etc.). SKS’s strategy is
economical, as they do not have to invest in
two asset types per beneficiary; the focus on
daily wage labour means that assets can be
treated as an income boost rather than an
income replacement; members are not given
an excuse for discontinuing their current
livelihood source and relying solely on
programme benefits.
z Need for more guidance in identifying
potential enterprise risks: Members are not
always able at the beginning to think of all of
the factors that influence success in an
enterprise. In some instances, where a
member’s caste or community are all engaged
in a certain enterprise, it makes sense for
them to stick to what they know. But as one
member who took donkeys stated,
If I took a buffalo my community would be fine
with it. But everyone in my caste has donkeys so I
selected it. It doesn’t bring me that much income –
if I realised then how profitable buffaloes are, I
might have picked that over donkeys. I didn’t know.
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Table 2 Asset menu and relevant characteristics
Asset Characteristics of members Pre-existing skills Risks? Benefits?
that choose this asset needed?
Buffalo z need for daily income z experience with z need for fodder z daily income/milk
(pregnant) (does daily labour) buffalo rearing everyday z household income 
z 50 years or younger (needs z requires space from manure/own use
physical strength) z need to purchase z milk for family/ 
z access to wastelands for fodder in rainy season children
fodder z must build a cattle z income from calves
z enough space within the house shed (300 INR) z social status of having 
z confidence in buffalo rearing buffalo
z need neighbour/relative 
support
Goats z no need for immediate z experience with z requires grazing z cheaper to feed than 
(pregnant ) income goat rearing z goats are susceptible buffalo (only graze on 
z limited space outside, to disease leaves, cheaper to buy 
more space indoors z kids are easily eaten grass if not available, 
z physical strength by wolves/dogs and than fodder)
z confidence with animals die of disease z delivers calves 2x a 
z support from others z theft year, each time up to 3 
z access to grazing area z frequent miscarriages kids
z won’t give regular z substantial income 
income from selling goats, easy 
z need to lock them to build a herd
indoors z can use manure, sell it
Land lease z investment capacity z experience with z crop damage z food security
z no need for immediate cultivating land z labour costs z highest income/ 
income z knowledge of crops z risk of rain or biggest risk
z more risk-taking and harvesting drought z can diversify and use 
z strength to work on land z delayed income as grazing land/fodder
z high-risk venture z ability to work in own 
field
Kirana shop z more confidence required z knows how to sell z selling on credit z can do other side 
(small than other assets z business experience z items may spoil businesses (e.g. making 
trade) z comfortable with money z basic accounting z more risk of failure, bidis, purchase goats, etc.)
z basic arithmetic skills skills business not insured z gives daily income
z surrounded by lots of like livestock z high potential for
houses z easy to deplete profitability
z strong social networks to stock for personal use z can stay at home with 
build clientele z requires a lot of FA small children
z active sellers already supervision z less physical labour
z more than 12 hours required
work z can purchase household
goods from own shop
z ability to save more
Others (e.g. z has caste-based skills z technical skills z limited FA support z can devote less time
tailoring, z uncomfortable with already z no need to learn a 
vegetable livestock new skill
vending, z can manage asset with 
etc.) limited supervision/assistance
FA, field assistant.
FGD results showed that a shop owner and a
restaurant owner were least happy with their
assets. They did not have previous business
experience, and such enterprises are
challenging. As with most enterprises that
involve selling on credit, their biggest problem
was re-collecting the money from customers.
When asked why they chose this enterprise, they
said they did not want livestock, and their field
assistant (FA) gave them this opportunity as it
sounded interesting. At the same time, another
shop owner had diversified with the help of her
FA. When asked about her success, she stated
that she only pays wholesalers after she has
collected everything back from those who took
credit. She had previous business experience and
confidence. They all received appropriate advice
from their FA, but they joined the programme
with different pre-existing skill sets. Selecting
the proper asset is the essence of livelihood
strategy, and must involve more than interest in
an idea. FAs must honestly ask themselves, ‘can
this member succeed in doing this?’ The
characteristics presented in Table 2 should be
considered when matching assets to skill sets.
2.5 Field assistant interface
The concept that underlies the Ultra Poor
programme is that extremely poor women
require more than financial or technical inputs,
and need close support in developing the skills
and confidence to effectively utilise these
resources. Poverty is not just a lack of money, but
a set of interconnecting physical, social and
psychological weaknesses. The role of the field
assistant is to accompany members out of
poverty. This entails helping them to boost their
real income, but also developing their
imaginations, sense of agency (Kabeer 2002) and
capability to aspire (Appadurai 2004). These are
important resources that human beings draw
upon in their efforts to fulfil their present needs
and imagine a better future for themselves and
their children.
Field assistance involves a combination of
encouragement, instilling discipline, education
and providing access to resources. They provide
the following support to ultra poor members:
z Weekly centre meetings and household visits
z Classroom livelihoods trainings
z Health education and messaging on pertinent
social issues
z Regular entrepreneurial advice and hand-
holding
z Goal-setting and a plan to reach the goals by
the end of the programme
z Foster autonomy by weaning members off
programmatic inputs
z Encourage and foster the use of government
resources
z Formal financial education.
The FAs have a standardised approach to service
delivery – their centre meetings all have the
same components and order, and trainings are all
conducted in a similar fashion. They deliver the
same social messages, using the same types of
mechanisms (games, flip charts, etc.) There is
little room for individual creativity and ad hoc
assistance. Microfinance operations typically
identify this regimented client/staff approach as
an important element of programmatic success
(Hashemi 2006).
Field assistants are teachers of ultra poor
members. Members do not necessarily see FAs as
a ‘friend’ whom they can confide in, as FAs keep
household visits brief. SKS senior staff have said
this is intentional to avoid emotional
dependence, as FAs will no longer support
members once the programme ends. According
to the members, they see the FA as a ‘guru’
whom they respect and have learned from.
Members also unanimously gave credit to FAs for
their pivotal role in shaping their livelihood
visions and goals. FAs took the critical step of
establishing goals with members, and helping
them build and grow their businesses. A kirana
shop owner proudly recounted her plans to start
selling clothing in her store – with the advice and
help of her FA. Another member claimed that she
is currently getting Rs6 per litre of buffalo milk
from the nearby market, but her FA is working on
aggregating the milk supply of all members so
that they can start selling to a milk distribution
centre for higher profits. The idea and
implementation of a milk cooperative exemplifies
the dedication, innovation and commitment of
FAs to help members thrive with their livelihoods.
2.6 Financial education
SKS offers a well-designed, rigorous financial
education module for members to learn basic
money management skills. Financial education is
not a standard input for BRAC or the other
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graduation pilots, but given SKS’s focus upon
income generation and sustainability, the
strategy makes sense.
The module covers the following areas: income
and expenditure tracking, budgeting, financial
goal-setting and financial negotiations.
In the income and expenditure tracking, FAs
collect information such as that presented in
Figure 2.
FAs then analyse the data and share the results
with members. As an FA stated, ‘we can
appreciate how hard it is to cut down
expenditure and maximise income, but we know
that our members will continue to suffer unless
they make these financial changes.’
Each meeting focuses upon a particular member
to ensure that the training is practical and
relevant. In the financial goal-setting module, for
example, the member of that week is asked to
show with rocks, the number of assets she has
now, the number she wants to have at the end of
this programme, and explain how she plans on
reaching that goal. She is given fake money to
make transactions, while the other members
watch.
Members all claim to enjoy the financial
education module, and as a result of the goal-
setting exercise, members have also been able to
articulately explain where they want their
livelihoods to be at the time of graduation. At
baseline, members’ time horizons were limited
and most were unable to look past the prospect
of feeding their children for the next few days.
The following statements show how their time
and visual horizons expanded:
I have two goats now. I want to grow my herd – by the
time this programme finishes, I hope I’ll have six or
seven goats. I will keep the female ones so my herd will
grow, sell the male ones to buy more females. With a big
goat herd, I will never have to worry about money.
I currently have a plot of land where I grow lentils. If
I have a good harvest, I can make up to Rs7,000.
With that money, I will reinvest and purchase another
plot of land and grow another variety of lentil. I will
keep reinvesting in land – I don’t know how to raise
animals, but I know that with the profits from two
plots of land I will be in a good position when I
graduate.
Despite these advances, the various idiosyncratic
and life cycle shocks that UP members face
(health shocks, dowry expenses, etc.) force them
to take on debt as a crisis coping mechanism.
They are not resilient enough to rely on their
assets or savings, and this element of their
poverty trap has not been effectively dealt with
by the programme. Many members borrow
against their group interest-free and pay back
slowly, and if the group savings cannot meet
their needs, FAs encourage members to borrow
from government self-help groups at 1 per cent
interest. Although advice is given to reduce
members’ reliance upon money lenders who
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Figure 2 Income and expenditure survey
Income Expenditure
Cash in hand Expenditure on enterprise
Members’ income from daily wages Food and consumption items
Other family members’ income Health and medical expenditure
Income from the enterprise Expenditure on other general items
Income from SKS grant/allowance Credit/hand loan repayments
Income from credit/hand loans Travelling cost
Other income Misc. exp.
Total income Total expenditure
Members’ weekly savings
Balance cash in hand
charge extortionate interest rates, members feel
there is a strong need for a module that properly
teaches them how to manage debt.
3 Discussion: who graduates and why
Upon completing the UPP programme, an
internal graduation assessment indicated that
95 per cent of members were ready to graduate
out of extreme poverty and into a sustainable
livelihood. SKS used the following criteria to
determine graduation eligibility:
z Multiple sources of income
z Savings of at least Rs800
z Adequate food, shelter and clothing
z At least one month’s rice supply
z Awareness and ability to access government
services (health, pro-poor benefits, etc.)
z Ability to maintain or expand their livelihood
(through savings scheme, microfinance loan
or government self-help group).
SKS rendered that 405 women were able to
graduate from UP by fulfilling this criteria, while
21 were unable to graduate. This highlights an
issue that requires further discussion: although
everyone was given the same set of resources and
inputs, why is it that some managed to succeed
while others did not?
Qualitative interviews help us to understand that
idiosyncratic traits may go a great deal towards
explaining why some poor women are more able
than others to take advantage of the emerging
opportunities provided to them. Those that did not
graduate shared some of the following characteristics:
z Lack of personal agency and motivation to
improve their trajectory
z Exposure to serious health shocks drained
these members of household resources, and in
several cases, left them bereft of a household
income earner
z High number of dependents to earners: the
weakest members lacked other income
earners within the household, and were forced
to support many dependents on their meagre
earnings
z Environmental shocks, specifically droughts,
that ate into members’ agricultural gains.
The oscillating nature of poverty must also be
considered, as SKS is evaluating members’
performance based on a static snapshot. In some
instances, a health or environmental shock
eroded a members’ gains temporarily, but they
may have had the resilience to overcome these
setbacks post-programme. Similarly, those who
graduated may not be able to sustain these gains
– one would need to revisit them in the future to
see if they were able to maintain this progress.
Although members are evaluated at a point in
time, much like students sitting for a final exam,
the results cannot tell us if members have
definitively ‘graduated’ out of extreme poverty.
At the most, they give us a benchmark of what
members have been able to achieve upon
receiving 18 months of programmatic support.
What we can say with certainty is that over the
course of 18 months, the majority of UPP
members developed sustainable livelihoods with
some safety nets in place.
4 Conclusion
This article has attempted to uncover why the
graduation programme targets the poorest more
rigorously and delivers upon the tenets of a social
protection agenda more effectively than state
run poverty alleviation schemes.
Given the findings explored here, is the
graduation scheme in India an effective response
to extreme poverty that the state should adopt
and implement? Engaging with the state will
enable this initiative to reach masses of the
extreme poor rather than simply pockets, and
according to the Director of SKS, ‘it will be
difficult for this programme to reach its
maximum potential without involvement from
the state’.
This desire for accuracy is evident throughout
SKS’s implementation, but is absent in the
government’s approaches to poverty alleviation.
Although SKS is regimented and believes in
standardising processes, they also customise
some inputs to contextual specificities. For
instance, SKS is now expanding the graduation
model to Orissa, but are first extensively
researching which livelihoods could flourish in
this forest-based, tribal context. There are no
daily wage labour schemes in the remote region
where the programme is being implemented, so
the stipend and assets must be re-conceputalised
to meet the gap for short-term income. SKS is
driven by their organisational belief that
properly matching livelihood choices to skill sets
is the basis for programmatic success. With top-
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down government programmes, that same
attention to detail is lost.
However, would SKS be able to maintain this
level of responsiveness when scaling-up to
millions, and will it ever have the resources
necessary to do so? The state can effectively
scale, but would the crucial element of hand-
holding disappear? Would the model get stripped
of its personal touch and turn into another bare-
boned asset distribution scheme?
A potential way forward could be the marrying of
methods between the state and civil society. The
state has the ability to effectively scale, while the
NGO has a client-driven ethos. Perhaps the NGO
can implement with resources provided by the
state, or the government staff can be trained by
the NGO on how to keep the varied needs of the
extreme poor at the forefront of their strategy?
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Notes
1 The pilots are in the following countries:
Honduras, Peru, Haiti, India, Pakistan, Yemen
and Ethiopia.
2 It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to
determine whether these members are in fact
the poorest – this would require a comparison
of UPP members with MFI clients, as well as
others in the community who are not part of
this programme.
3 The baseline survey was conducted by the
organisation implementing the randomised
control trial for SKS’ UPP programme. The
process evaluators drew upon the survey
results to triangulate qualitative findings.
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